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events (Haferburg & Steinbrink, 2017; Maharaj, 
2015). The primary justifications for wishing to 
stage these global events is that they can function 
as tools for progressing and levering major eco-
nomic revenue streams, reshaping infrastructure, 
Introduction
Over recent years, “Global South” cities and 
nations have increased their bidding activities in an 
attempt to compete to host a range of mega-sporting 
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This article presents a case study of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and the 2016 Olympic Games 
in Rio de Janeiro to explore infrastructure development and physical legacies connected to the plan-
ning, bidding, and staging of mega-sporting events. Primary data were collected in Cuiabá in two 
phases during the 2014 World Cup and after the event in 2015. This entailed participant observation, 
structured observation, document analysis, and 15 semistructured interviews with the local popula-
tion, as well as current and former government and stadium employees. Following the Rio 2016 
Olympic Games primary data were collected from Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro. In January 2018, 
15 semistructured interviews were undertaken with tour operators and cultural businesses. Signifi-
cant evidence indicates the ineffectiveness of urban and rural infrastructure development and facility 
improvements, delays and cancellations in infrastructure programs, stadiums and venues overshoot-
ing their original costs and budgetary requirements, and controversial targeted transport interven-
tions. Practical managerial recommendations and strategies are offered to aid the implementation, 
management, and maintenance of host city infrastructure during the planning, bidding, hosting, and 
post-sporting event phases.
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Following this, we present our case studies and dis-
cuss the results pertaining to preevent evaluations 
and postevent legacies. Finally, managerial impli-
cations, practical recommendations, and further 
research directions are proposed.
Hosting Mega-Sporting Events: Budgets, 
Infrastructure, and Urban Development
Cities, regions, and nations have long been 
drawn to hosting MSEs for their plethora of posi-
tive social and economic benefits. However, there 
is now a growing literature that warns that some 
hosts have experienced negative socioeconomic 
outcomes (Preuss, 2007, 2015). For example, ini-
tial costs and budgets for a host city or region can 
be hopeful and linked to economic predictions that 
are frequently overstated, resulting in a failure to 
materialize long-term tangible benefits (Cashman 
& Horne, 2013; Preuss, 2009). The funding of 
these projects often culminates in hosting regions 
accepting enormous debts connected to infrastruc-
ture development and maintenance (Thomson et 
al., 2013). Li (2013) separated the infrastructure 
requirements for large-scale sporting events into 
two categories. Firstly, specific infrastructure 
established primarily for the event (e.g., stadia and 
accommodation for athletes). Moreover, the sec-
ond category accounted for infrastructure essen-
tial for hosting the event, such as transportation 
systems (Li, 2013; Searle, 2012). Cabral and Silva 
(2013) extended this to include the use of ancil-
lary facilities, which they emphasized to incor-
porate museums and convention centers located 
nearby stadiums. Preuss (2009) argued it is often 
these ancillary facilities that form a positive legacy, 
although the future operational costs are largely 
underestimated (Mills & Rosentraub, 2013).
Substantial budgets and resources are needed 
to develop the appropriate sporting, transport, and 
ancillary infrastructure, which commonly leads to a 
reliance on public expenditure and subsidies from 
taxpayers (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Mills & Rosen-
traub, 2013; Preuss & Schnitzer, 2015). These funds 
can be diverted from social and environmental pro-
grams to the development of sporting infrastruc-
ture (Cabral & Silva, 2013; Jones, 2001; Li, 2013; 
Preuss, 2009). In turn, most large-scale facility and 
venue constructions are justified on the basis of 
exploiting tourism demand, and expanding urban 
upgrade projects throughout the host city or nation 
(Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Jones, 2001; Müller, 
2012; Thornley, 2002). Successful bids have been 
tabled by the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, 
and South Africa, who have intentionally pursued 
strategies to fast track infrastructure construction 
programs that address a lack of basic physical 
structures and sporting facilities (Gaffney, 2015; 
Haferburg & Steinbrink, 2017; Müller, 2012; 
Silvestre, 2016).
Although frameworks to test and measure 
legacies have been discussed, particularly in aca-
demic circles (e.g., Dickson, Benson & Blackman, 
2011; Kassens-Noor, Wilson, Müller, Maharaj & 
Huntoon, 2015), we argue these evaluations tend 
to fall short politically due to the lengthy period 
of time needed to evaluate the success of sporting 
event legacies (Carlsen & Taylor, 2003). Tensions 
are prevalent between these evaluation processes 
and the political justification for short-term legacy 
results. Coakley and Souza (2013) suggested event 
legacies are envisaged, debated, and created in the 
political actions of the bid preparation. We align 
with this notion and use the preevent phase as our 
focus for this short-term legacy assessment.
This article tracks the infrastructure impacts 
and legacy of two mega-sporting events (MSEs) 
in Brazil within a 2-year period. Brazil hosted the 
2014 FIFA Football World Cup and the Rio 2016 
Olympic Games, a feat not previously achieved by 
any other country (Li, 2013), and therefore offers 
an opportunity to analyze the two events within the 
context of the same country. In doing so, the article 
makes two contributions to the literature. First, our 
article responds to calls for examinations on the 
Global South MSE experience (Maharaj, 2015). 
Second, we contribute to knowledge surrounding 
how the preevent forces are enacted in the “glo-
cal” production of sporting infrastructure, and how 
that influences the postevent infrastructure legacy 
(Horne, 2011; Thomson, Schlenker, & Schulenkorf, 
2013). The article unfolds as followed: in the next 
section, we begin by reviewing the literature on 
preevent, bidding, and planning ambitions in a 
number of MSE locations. Infrastructure, venue 
development, and budgetary management are 
outlined and assessed in relation to recent men’s 
FIFA football World Cups and Olympic Games. 
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corruption, transparency, and knowledge as influ-
ential dimensions upon the levels of public trust, 
and retaining or restoring this trust requires multiple 
stakeholder engagement and political will. Further-
more, the authors establish that public trust should 
form an integral part of any future bid package, but 
to date, organizers have failed to appreciate such 
elements. Other researchers such as Henne (2015) 
argued that little is known about the consequences 
of transparency and corruption linked to MSEs, 
and empirical infrastructure analysis is scant within 
MSE studies (Li, 2013). Therefore, we address this 
gap by analyzing the impact of preevent organiza-
tion on the legacy of two events. Specifically, we 
focus on two host territories: Cuiabá (Brazil 2014 
FIFA World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio de 
Janeiro (Rio 2016 Olympic Games).
Brazilian Political and Policy Environment
Brazil is unique in the social and political context 
in which the two mega-sporting events, Brazil 2014 
and Rio 2016, took place. Politics is closely aligned 
to functioning components of society within Brazil; 
military dictatorship is still in living memory, and 
senior political officials are involved in ongoing 
national corruption investigations, which led to the 
2015 impeachment of President Dilma and impris-
onment of former President Lula (Cowie, 2018). 
This is set against the backdrop of over 1 mil-
lion people taking to the streets in 2013 to protest 
against hosting the 2014 World Cup (Watts, 2013). 
In Rio, there were similar anti-Olympic Games 
street marches and protests. Ultimately, the public 
was voicing their concerns on public spending for 
event infrastructure (e.g., stadiums) when health 
and education needed to take priority. Although 
a country at peace, Brazil’s internal politics and 
social divisions are stark (Korstanje, Tzanelli, & 
Clayton, 2014), therefore offering a contested ter-
rain in which politics played a significant role in 
the planning, running, and evaluation of the two 
MSEs.
In recent times, comparable to the internal politi-
cal implosion in Brazil, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) have come under 
increased scrutiny over costly host outlays and 
the lack of transparency in how these “regimes” 
their prospective benefit to the economy and local 
participation levels postevent (Gaffney, 2015). 
Searle (2002) noted that this relocation of spend-
ing and resources could have negative impacts on 
urban development in other areas of the city or 
region. Hence, understanding locals’ perceptions in 
preevent periods, engaging the host community in 
the decision-making processes, and securing locals’ 
MSE support are seen as critical success attributes 
(Michopoulou & Giuliano, 2018; Pappas, 2018; 
Ritchie, 2000). For example, in response to accusa-
tions of facilities becoming “white elephants” after 
the event, where the stadia are underused, some 
structures are designed to be dismantled after the 
event or reduced in capacity (Gratton & Preuss, 
2008; Li, 2013; Müller, 2012; Thornley, 2002).
Towards Theorizing the Importance of 
Preevent Evaluation for Legacy
In the MSE lifecycle—bidding, planning and 
preparation, event delivery and postevent wrap 
up, and handover (Hiller, 1998; Kirby, Duignan, & 
McGillivray, 2018)—legacy is broadly accepted as 
occurring in the postevent stage and incorporates 
the events context, temporal nature of planning, 
and positive and negative aspects that form in the 
hosting region (Preuss, 2007, 2015; Thomson et al., 
2013). The above studies, like most examinations 
on legacies, predominantly focus on the immediate 
postevent outcomes. Coakley and Souza (2013) sug-
gested rather than measuring the legacy outcomes 
at the postevent stage, there is room to evaluate the 
processes in the preevent stage and identify the fac-
tors that may detract favorable legacy outputs. To 
understand how legacies are formed, it is important 
to recognize the actors who have power to influence 
the development of legacy plans. In his evaluation 
of Brazil, India, and South Africa, Maharaj (2015) 
found the public had little or no consultation as 
costs escalated and the poorest became increasingly 
adversely constrained by the MSEs. He recognized 
the relationship between the private and public 
sector controlling the flow of capital and direction 
of activities during the planning and construction 
phases. On the other hand, Nunkoo, Ribeiro, Sun-
nassee, and Gursoy (2018) developed a theoretical 
framework associated with public trust in institu-
tions organizing mega-sporting events. They posit 
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on the operations of the MSE. This includes the 
host city or region’s physical location, the current 
economic outlook, and the extent to which politi-
cians possess a final say in key event decisions. A 
constellation of external contingent actors impart 
and influence the trajectory of the MSE with their 
divergent perspectives (e.g., public authorities or 
state-run departments). Other agreements like the 
host city contract (HCC) are activated between 
the private sport’s governing body (e.g., IOC) and 
local host city. Additionally, the representation of 
the host region is mediated through their involve-
ment with prominent international corporations and 
global press outlets.
Method
The study is informed by empirical data col-
lected by the two researchers from the most recent 
mega-sporting events held in Brazil—the 2014 
FIFA World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic Games. 
We present case studies of the two cities, Cuiabá 
(World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro 
(Olympic Games), to illustrate contextual similari-
ties and differences in a bounded time scale, deter-
mined by the wider socioeconomic circumstances 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). It is acknowl-
edged that the results from these cases cannot be 
generalized to all host cities, but reflect the types 
award bidding contracts to host cities. In particu-
lar, FIFA have struggled to cope with corruption 
scandals, facing a public backlash and garner-
ing attention from the press that has ensured that 
their problematic reputation remains a continual 
issue (Horne & Silvestre, 2016). Both the IOC 
and FIFA have tried to counteract these claims by 
aligning themselves with the global discourse on 
sustainable development, declaring their flagship 
events are socially and environmentally beneficial 
(Hayes & Karamichas, 2012).
The politics within the government and arrange-
ments with international organizing bodies were 
fundamental to the special political circumstances 
that the article discusses. This article takes a chron-
ological perspective and charts how Cuiabá and 
Rio de Janeiro were selected for, prepared, and 
hosted these events. As such, we have proposed 
a conceptual framework to visualize the creation 
and development of planned infrastructure goals 
(see Fig. 1). The “Host Event Project Planning for 
Infrastructure” (HEEPI) Nexus presents and delin-
eates the planning processes enlisted throughout 
the bidding protocols of the two Brazilian MSEs. 
A number of planning dimensions must be priori-
tized for the hosting of the event to go ahead. For 
instance, constructing venues, upgrading facilities, 
and/or delivering stadia renovations. Simultane-
ously, a range of factors act as an external force 
Figure 1. Host Event Project Planning for Infrastructure Nexus.
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outcomes (Pink, 2013). Moreover, the first author 
undertook and analyzed a range of host city materi-
als including official bidding plans, local authority, 
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports.
Results and Discussion
Case Study: The 2014 World Cup Host 
City of Cuiabá
Cuiabá, the capital of Mato Grosso, is situated 
in the center-west region of Brazil (Crabb, 2018). 
During the bid phase, Cuiabá was one of 18 Bra-
zilian cities who bid to host the 2014 World Cup. 
In a FIFA inspection, Cuiabá was one of 6 cities 
thought to not have the appropriate infrastructure 
and therefore could not host the World Cup (FIFA, 
2007). However, in 2009, Cuiabá was announced as 
a host city, a coup largely achieved through politi-
cal maneuvering and use of personal networks of 
state-level elites, some of whom traveled to Swit-
zerland to liaise with FIFA officials (Wilson, 2014). 
As a peripheral city, there was a consolidated infra-
structure development program, including a new 
stadium (Arena Pantanal), to achieve international 
environmental certification and a new light railway 
system linking the stadium to key areas within the 
city. However, these two projects were beset with 
problems from the start.
Arena Pantanal Construction and Delivery
The initial bid package sent to FIFA was prepared 
by local architectural firm Castro Mello; they were 
also contracted by the Mato Grosso government to 
produce architectural drawings for the new stadium 
in the preparation phase. These drawings were 
never produced and before Cuiabá were declared 
as hosts, mismanagement had cost the tax payer 
R$500,000 (BRL R$) or £117,361 (Bess, 2013). 
Cuiabá were given host city status in 2009, con-
struction started in early 2010 but was temporarily 
suspended in November 2010 after Mato Grosso 
state auditors prevented funding from the state gov-
ernment due to irregularities with the budget (Tava-
res, 2011). In addition, the preparation phase was 
also tarnished by the change of seat supplier. The 
contract to supply the seats was won in July 2013 
by a Cuiabá-based company, Kango. They were 
of issues that host cities might encounter. Therefore, 
they are presented as standalone examples.
According to Yin (2018), there are four testing 
criteria for judging the quality of case study research 
design. These include construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity, and reliability. These tests 
for quality were applied throughout the collection 
of primary and secondary sources and triangulation 
was used to ensure the validity of sources. Valid-
ity in the primary data collection was maintained 
through the recruitment of a wide spectrum of state, 
corporate, and local community actors.
The second author collected data on the 2014 
FIFA World Cup host city of Cuiabá, capital city 
of Mato Grosso. Eleven months of ethnographic 
fieldwork in Cuiabá was undertaken in two phases 
between 2014 and 2015. The first phase coincided 
with the World Cup tournament and focused on the 
preparation of the tournament, while the second 
phase in 2015 focused on the short-term infrastruc-
ture and legacy impacts. Fifteen semistructured 
interviews were held with the local population, 
current and former government, and stadium 
employees. Documentary analysis was conducted 
on mainstream press and social media reports, 
official government, FIFA documentation, and 
unofficial blogs of residents in Cuiabá. Structured 
observation of the stadium, airport, and light rail-
way system line were undertaken in 2014 and 2015 
and participant observation was used to support or 
challenge the various claims by actors. Triangula-
tion was an essential aspect of data collection and 
analysis of data came from a multitude of sources 
(Atkinson, 2015).
The portion of the study conducted in Rio 
de Janeiro by the first researcher mirrored the 15 
semistructured interviews conducted by the sec-
ond researcher. Interviews were delivered with 
tourism and cultural organizations in January 
2018 to uncover insights into the post-Rio 2016 
Games physical infrastructure legacies. Over the 
course of a 3-week period, 1,700 photographs 
were obtained; this was supplemented by regular 
videos—nine individual online videos were created 
altogether. Approaches to ethnographic techniques 
generated knowledge and themes using visual data 
(photographs), web-based tools, and digital video 
recordings (e.g., vlogs) to represent the researchers’ 
experience and issues relating to MSE infrastructure 
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outset of the bid phase. When the original bid 
package was created in 2009, the state govern-
ment intended to build a railway system in the city. 
After consultation they revised the plans and devel-
oped a bus expressway, costing R$488.8million 
(£114,732,167). In 2011, a new state government 
traveled to Porto, Portugal and after witnessing 
their train system decided to reinstate the train plans 
at a cost of R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555). It was 
thought the VLT would promote Cuiabá as a mod-
ern city (Farinha, 2011). The former governor who 
endorsed the bus expressway gave his perspective 
on the change: 
It was obvious to everyone the VLT was too expen-
sive, we didn’t need it. We needed more buses with 
more routes. The route of the VLT would not help 
the congestion in the down town area, that is why 
we chose the bus expressway. (Interview 7)
Cuiabá was the smallest 2014 Brazil Football 
World Cup host city and is suggested to have suf-
fered the most extensive government infrastructure 
project intervention (Gaffney, 2015). The prepara-
tion phase was beset with problems and this resulted 
in the train system not being in place by the event 
delivery phase. The widened roads ready for the 
installation remained unfinished and large stretches 
of the road contained high fencing that was still 
visible throughout the tournament (see Fig. 2). A 
commuter reflected on the impact of the transport 
developments on her daily life: 
I use the bus every day, but it takes so long. The 
buses are old, so the windows have to be open, but 
the fumes from the traffic jams make the air hor-
rible. This VLT should have been finished months 
ago, but it’s barely started. (Interview 12)
Works were still not concluded in the postevent 
phase. This is a consequence of contractual dis-
putes and delays in the construction of the VLT 
system, which stopped in December 2014, and 
to date has yet to restart. In September 2016, the 
only actor bought to account for the corruption in 
the construction of the stadium and the VLT was 
the Governor during that period. Governor Silval 
Barbosa was responsible for signing off contracts 
and releasing funds. He was at the center of a cor-
ruption investigation in June 2014 where he was 
initially arrested but released on bail. As part of 
to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of R$19.4 million 
(£4,553,608). An investigation by the civil pros-
ecution service advised the cancellation of the con-
tract as they found Kango supplied the National 
Stadium in Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. As a 
result of this investigation Kango lost the contract 
to another company, Desk, who quoted the state 
government R$150 (£35.21) per seat. Due to incon-
sistencies related to another contract in Sao Paulo, 
the company was not permitted to hold a contract 
with a government-based enterprise for 5 years. At 
this point in 2013, the original company, Kango, 
had their contract reinstated after they offered their 
original contract at a 6% discount. A new contract 
was then conceived and Kango stated the seats 
would be installed by 2015 unless a premium was 
paid (Segalla, 2013).
Although the event delivery phase was successful, 
the postevent phase of the cycle has been controver-
sial. Since the 2014 Brazil World Cup, the stadium 
has been chronically underused, primarily due to 
construction problems still not being resolved. The 
stadium was closed in January 2015 due to flooding 
caused by the wet season. By 2016 the official capac-
ity of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 
2016). On the  July 15, 2016, the Mato Grosso 
government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to 
the construction company Santa Barbara and Men-
des Junior after they had not completed the agreed 
works (Pablo, 2016). In 2016, only R$100,000 had 
been made from events with an average crowd of 
766 for the local football team, compared to monthly 
maintenance costs of R$600,000. In January 2017, a 
survey was undertaken to assess the main problems 
of the stadium. Findings of this survey revealed the 
sound system was not fully functioning, obvious 
flooding in the dressing rooms from the wet season, 
and homeless squatters occupying the restaurant 
areas (Rimoli, 2018). One resident summarized 
their feelings:
I am so sad when I look at the stadium, it could 
have been so beautiful, but corruption is every-
where. Welcome to Brazil, welcome to my city. 
(Interview 3)
VLT Infrastructure Program
The other main infrastructure project, the rail-
way system (VLT), was contentious from the 
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& Santos Jr., 2017). Ancillary infrastructure was 
also planned, including the Rio Museum of Art 
(Museu de Arte do Rio-MAR) and the Museum of 
Tomorrow (Guerra et al., 2018). The Rio Museum 
of Art opened before the start of the 2014 World 
Cup in March 2013 and both museums are housed 
in the Mauá Square (Praça Mauá, see Fig. 3). The 
Museum of Tomorrow (Museu do Amanhã) is a 
lavish waterfront building erected at the Pier Mauá 
in late 2015, designed by lauded Spanish architect 
Santiago Calatrava (Carvalho, 2016; Sanchez & 
Essex, 2017). At first glance, the museum is seen 
to project the values and practices of sustainability 
in its engineering and internal exhibitions, blending 
art and science, and enabling visitors to envisage 
an ecologically sound future (Watts, 2015). These 
developments enacted were perceived to be mar-
ginal to the 2016 Olympics, but they have become 
increasingly intertwined with the preparation of 
the Games (Carvalho, 2016). Additionally, con-
struction companies and other corporate interests 
(e.g., office towers, hotels) played a major role in 
expediting Porto Maravilha’s regeneration plans 
(Ribeiro & Santos Jr., 2017; Silvestre, 2016).
Ancillary Infrastructure, Facility Development, 
and Urban Spatial Transformation
Reconfigurations catalysed by the Porto Mara-
vilha project have changed the dynamics in the Pier 
Mauá plaza, as emphasized by a number of inter-
viewees. One cultural organization exemplified 
that the land was:
the police investigation “Sodom,” Silval was later 
arrested again in September 2015. This investiga-
tion sought to uncover claims that the state govern-
ment defrauded the federal government by falsely 
claiming grants. Barbosa is said to have endorsed 
34 contracts as Governor of Mato Grosso, includ-
ing RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) for the VLT, of 
which R$500 million (£117,361,054) was said to 
be distributed to his colleagues (Ultimo Segundo, 
2017).
Case Study: Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Porto 
Maravilha’s Urban Development Program
Porto Maravilha was deployed through urban 
regeneration projects to remodel ambitious reforms 
of the old industrial and historic port (Carvalho, 
2016: Guerra, Ferreira, & Kipnis, 2018). The 
“Marvelous Port” revitalization of the harbor and 
downtown areas can be credited to the Eduardo 
Paes administration, who was the former mayor 
of the city from 2009 to 2017 (Carvalho, 2016). 
Urban development strategies amounted to infra-
structure costs of R$8 billion covering an area of 
5 million square meters (see Fig. 3), incorporat-
ing the docklands, VLT transport implementation, 
and the opening of new boulevards and squares 
(e.g., the Olympic Boulevard) (CDURP, 2016; 
Guerra et al., 2018; Rio de Janeiro City Govern-
ment, 2014; Silvestre, 2016). In preparation for 
the Olympics, the revitalization of the port district 
was designated as one of the main legacies, and a 
neoliberal experiment to capture the city (Ribeiro 
Figure 2. The VLT railway in Cuiabá, an unfinished infrastructure program associated 
with the 2014 World Cup (author’s own photographs).
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completely destroyed . . . it was a bus parking lot . . .  
nothing happened here before it was a dead zone . . .  
with this project, what happened is that you have a 
completely renovated area.
Although, these physical environmental changes 
could deter desirable outputs for the local, deprived 
populations and spark gentrification processes in 
the port area. One participant remarked that there 
was a
high social cost . . . but it’s more of an aesthetic 
thing, just a facade. It looks good but is it really 
good because we still have problems with health, 
and education and security.
In the media, misleading figures have circu-
lated and been reported on concerning the costs of 
the construction of architectural installations and 
facilities in Porto Maravilha. Figures relating to the 
Museum of Tomorrow are disputed from £40 mil-
lion or $59 million (Watts, 2015) to claims from 
one interviewee of astronomical levels of R$245 
million. On the face of it, a range of hard infra-
structure implementations did not satisfactorily 
meet local demand for facilities (Gratton & Preuss, 
2008; Li, 2013; Thornley, 2002).
Moving out from the main Porto Maravilha pre-
cinct, poor quality of facilities for the local com-
munity is evident. For example, this is reflected in 
the sad state of affairs of the Gamboa Olympic Vil-
lage (Vila Olímpica da Gamboa, see Fig. 4). The 
Figure 3. Overview of Porto Maravilha districts and urban infrastructure development 
zones (based on CDURP, 2016; RioOnWatch, 2016, and author’s emphasis).
Figure 4. Gamboa Olympic village (author’s own 
photographs).
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participant stated these spaces are “areas that allow 
for these big events and shows.” Spatial transfor-
mations in Praça Mauá have led to new initiatives 
such as pop-up markets. Another interviewee men-
tioned events developed in partnership with local 
cultural partners (e.g., museums) in the port zone, 
including the debut of the Rio de Janeiro Women of 
the World Festival (Festival Mulheres do Mundo, 
2018). This festival is described as a celebration of 
the achievements of women and the inaugural edi-
tion landed in Rio in November 2018.
Urban Transport Network: Targeted 
Removal or Inclusive Improvements?
A sign of the planning and targeted interventions 
in Porto Maravilha is the implementation of the light 
rail vehicle (VLT). The government promise was to 
add substantial investment in transportation to con-
nect routes stretching in and out of Porto Maravilha. 
Paes’ ideas on the transit reforms were to link the 
transport networks—metro, buses, and airports—
particularly the 28 km light rail from Gamboa to 
venue was inaugurated in 2004 as a recreation cen-
ter and physical site designed to support sport and 
leisure activities (e.g., athletics, swimming, and 
skateboarding) for the local community in Gam-
boa. This perspective was emphasized by a local 
tour operator who reiterated the depressing sights 
of the facility:
This use to be setup as a skate park. You can see 
there was a track here for running and you can see 
the condition of this and a football installation . . .  
they build it and leave, there’s no maintenance, 
there’s no budget to take care of this stuff. . . . 
This park use to be a really nice facility when they 
opened it. It’s absolutely shocking!
The current situation of the infrastructure and 
recreation sites has demonstrated minimal prepara-
tion to feasibly maintain and upkeep the conditions 
of the facilities. In a number of instances, infra-
structure and venues have been left redundant.
On the other hand, some would argue the out-
look of the rejuvenated port is a clear improvement, 
recognizing all the physical structures that sprung 
up from this development and renovated “Olympic 
Boulevard” (Boulevard Olimpico). A cultural cen-
ter spoke positively about the transformation of the 
port and the signals emanating from the residential 
market:
we are looking very optimistic about the Porto 
Maravilha project. But we know that takes time 
and it’s important that the residential area of Porto 
Maravilha becomes a success.
However, in terms of real estate development 
and the corporate vacancy rate, a plethora of fac-
tors have influenced the current stock of retail and 
industrial office space in the port. Developing and 
retaining international corporations is a prevalent 
issue in Porto Maravilha. This is illustrated through 
the widespread empty and dilapidated corporate 
offices and towers littering the skyline (see Fig. 5).
Real-time analysis post-Games found that Rio 
de Janeiro’s ex-Olympic event public spaces and 
dwellings have been designated to stage temporary 
events. A couple of the interviewees highlighted the 
central port area acting as a springboard and focal 
point as public space opportunities start to ripen for 
commercial event animation (Smith, 2018), includ-
ing Praça Mauá and the Olympic Boulevard. One 
Figure 5. Empty corporate office building (author’s own 
photograph).
636 KIRBY AND CRAB
empty. In Cuiabá, the VLT still remains unfinished 
and the stadium is falling into disrepair. These case 
studies have shown how external actors have been 
able to influence the development of infrastructure 
projects. This includes the federal and state gov-
ernments, sports organizing bodies, international 
corporations, and the local population. Each of 
these actors has their own agendas and has differ-
ent abilities to influence outcomes; however, this 
is not static and can shift as priorities, funding, and 
time scale change. In Table 1, we have provided 
a detailed review of the parallels and disparities 
relating to planning and infrastructure impacts that 
emerged from the two host city destinations, Cui-
abá and Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro.
Conclusions
In this article, we intended to provide rich, 
empirical, and critical insights to establish the 
state of planned infrastructure development and 
returns post-mega-sporting event (MSE). The two 
case settings in question, Cuiabá and Porto Mara-
vilha, illustrate how the infrastructure and urban 
legacies have been created and delivered in the 
short term. The review of the literature established 
what is not known in terms of the physical lega-
cies. For example, the legacy of these infrastruc-
ture works attached to the events’ bid preparation 
and delivery, and how this coexisted and operated 
within the confines of policy and decision making. 
In this regard, understanding the production of 
these legacies across the MSE lifecycle is pivotal. 
Particularly, how they are conceived across mul-
tiple locations, coupled with how key stakehold-
ers seize upon the power to influence the eventual 
manifestation of legacy plans. Hence, MSE bid-
ding and planning has been explored in order to 
make a judgement on the host cities’ physical and 
spatial legacies.
A number of persistent issues have been stressed 
in relation to the hosting capacity of the city or 
nation (i.e., Brazil). For instance, the role and 
demands of “collective elites” (e.g., public author-
ity and local organizing committee) in pushing 
through their local infrastructure agenda. In these 
examples, primary infrastructure as categorized by 
Li (2013) accounted for an extensive proportion of 
requirements (e.g., Cuiabá’s Arena Pantanal). The 
Central to Santos Dumont terminal (Carvalho, 
2016; CDURP, 2016). Key stations related to this 
study have been mapped and illustrated in Figure 
3. The controversy was evident surrounding which 
members of the local community the VLT served 
and the planned placement of the VLT tracks on 
streets. This assertion was highlighted by some 
participants, who claimed that:
it’s not a means of transportation. It’s not a means 
of transportation . . . it’s a means of changing the 
neighborhood, of valuing the neighborhood.
In this sense, problems in assembling the inte-
grated transport system were the ongoing dilemmas 
faced by city planners, policymakers, and the local 
organizing committee. In some extreme cases for 
neighborhoods urban planning devices like the exe-
cution of the VLT have dogmatically reaped chaos 
upon citizens, leaving behind a homogenized, 
characterless ghost town—awaiting the next urban 
retail market pump. Accessibility and the temporary 
creation of transport systems for the local popula-
tion was a highly questionable tactic pursued by the 
local authority.
Our analysis has presented multiple examples of 
infrastructure development as a consequence of host-
ing an MSE. Both cases demonstrated issues during 
the planning phase, which ultimately lead to defi-
cient legacy outcomes for the cities under the spot-
light. The time constraints between being awarded 
host city status and delivering finished infrastructure 
often invite complications for the local organizing 
committee and the state. For example, the seats in 
the Arena Pantanal were charged at a premium as 
the suppliers knew the constructors were working 
to a deadline. The seat suppliers were then able to 
profit at the expense of the taxpayer. A lack of trans-
parency in the negotiation of contracts has had long 
term impacts. The final bill for taxpayers in Rio is 
still unclear as contradictory reports on the costs cir-
culate. In Cuiabá, the difficulties surrounding nego-
tiating contractual agreements meant the VLT was 
not completed and the governor was imprisoned.
These underlying issues in the preparation phase 
have led to more widespread ramifications for both 
host cities. There has been no funding set aside 
for maintenance of venues and facilities in Rio de 
Janeiro and there are office building blocks standing 
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for the positioning of ancillary infrastructure reno-
vations, and dynamic interactions with urban “Live 
Site” public space regeneration (Smith, 2018), to 
new or upgraded urban transport systems. Across 
the board, host community involvement in the deci-
sion-making process was absent.
Applied to the context of the Global South, this 
examination delves into the critical relationship 
between MSE planning and urban infrastructure 
and renewal (Li, 2013). The cloud of uncertainty 
surrounding the degree to which infrastructure 
programs are seen to be unfinished and often 
importance of ancillary facilities encompassing 
museums and the extension of commercial build-
ings or units were more prominent in Rio de Janei-
ro—mainly due to the increased tourist numbers 
anticipated in the Porto Maravilha area. However, 
similarities can be drawn relating to the spiraling 
operational costs and budgetary management of 
both sites. In mega-sporting event-led planning 
and development, analysis of Cuiabá’s and Porto 
Maravilha’s urban projects highlights the lack of 
broader long-term thinking around how facilities 
are designed and organized. This includes visions 
Table 1 
Host City Review of Planning and Infrastructure Impacts
Key Host City Themes Cuiabá and Porto Maravilha Case Study Focus and Impact
Budgets and costs Original costs have overrun their estimations. In Cuiabá, the bus expressway was 
initially expected to cost R$488.8 million (£114,732,167) but this was replaced by 
the VLT at a staggering cost of R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555), funded by public 
finances.
The construction costs for Porto Maravilha’s prodigious installations (e.g., Museum 
of Tomorrow) are contested and surpassed their projected budgets (Watts, 2015).
Infrastructure construction and trans-
portation plans
Unfinished infrastructure development program: The Arena Pantanal (Cuiabá) did 
not receive the planned international environmental accreditation as construction 
was not finished on time. Disputes between the state government and construction 
company led to R$28 million (£6,572,219) being withheld from the construction 
company.
Delayed and/or cancelled projects: Cuiabá’s new light railway system (VLT) was not 
completed in time for the 2014 World Cup, due to a number of major construction 
delays and contractual disagreements. The Governor signed contracts worth RS1.4 
billion (£328,610,953) and the project remains unfinished at the time of writing.
Transportation faults: In Rio de Janeiro, implementing the VLT project contributed to 
widespread disruption and eroded access for local communities, especially in areas 
such as Gamboa. The controversy was also evident with regards to the location and 
routes of the VLT, and which communities the VLT served to benefit.
Stadiums, venues, and ancillary 
facilities
Stadia and venue usage: Due to the lack of strategic longer-term foresight in both cit-
ies, some venues and facilities remain underutilized. Although the Arena Pantanal’s 
capacity was reduced after the 2014 World Cup, the stadium possesses many of the 
facets of a “white elephant.”
Ancillary infrastructure and recreational facilities: The planning and integration of 
key ancillary facilities (e.g., the Rio Museum of Art and the Museum of Tomorrow) 
was poorly designed, coordinated, and ineffective in its execution. Moreover, the 
recreation center and site, Gamboa Olympic Village, has fallen into a dire state of 
disrepair and is therefore not able to fulfil its role in supporting local community 
sport and leisure activity.
Real estate development Abandonment and unoccupied urban space: In the port region of Rio de Janeiro, 
empty buildings, abandoned office towers, and industrial space can be linked to the 
development of real estate. This has exacerbated corporate vacancy rates in Porto 
Maravilha when compared to other districts in the city.
Transparency and corruption Corruption scandals: The Governor in Mato Grosso was charged with misusing public 
funds—VLT expenditure contributed to this conviction. Substantial evidence in the 
two host cities points to how the political elites were the beneficiaries to the detri-
ment of the local communities, commuters and the natural environment.
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MSE hosting (Maharaj, 2015). This is particularly 
important as more developing countries are set to 
host MSE events in the future. With lower levels of 
public expenditure than their Global North counter-
parts, they are more susceptible to corporate sector 
exploitation. Secondly, we have contributed to the 
growing focus on preevent planning as the cata-
lyst for transforming postevent outcomes. Here, it 
was found that the plethora of actors with different 
agendas and scope for influence attempt to assert 
their demands on the bidding and planning stages. 
This has been visualized in the “HEEPI” Nexus that 
was conceptualized earlier on in this article. Further 
research directions could explore the relationship 
between MSE facility developments, the expecta-
tions of locals, and achieving social outcomes. Lon-
gitudinal studies are necessary to tease out venue 
construction operational issues and evaluate the 
infrastructure decision-making processes of various 
relationships between government officials, policy-
makers, and building contractors. To this end, the 
study provides a critical event studies perspective 
and an in-depth picture of large-scale flagship devel-
opment programs. Mechanisms and approaches for 
maintaining longer-term investments in the physi-
cal landscape have to be realistic and manageable, 
which considers local, host community participa-
tion and inclusion to ultimately derive benefits from 
heavy infrastructure and facility construction.
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